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ABSTRACT: This paper shows how the critical questions matching an argumentation scheme can be mod-
eled in the Carneades argumentation system as three kinds of premises. Ordinary premises hold only if they 
are supported by sufficient arguments. Assumptions hold, by default, until they have been questioned. With 
exceptions the negation holds, by default, until the exception has been supported by sufficient arguments. 
By “sufficient arguments”, we mean arguments sufficient to satisfy the applicable proof standard. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently there has been a lot of interest in argumentation schemes because they provide a 
way of analyzing and evaluating many common defeasible forms of argument that would 
not be possible to evaluate using only deductive and inductive forms of reasoning. The 
use of schemes takes a different approach to argument evaluation from the standard way 
of applying forms of reasoning to arguments that we are familiar with in deductive and 
inductive methods of evaluating reasoning. Matching each scheme is a standardized set of 
critical questions representing different ways of critically probing into the weak points of 
an argument so that the arguer can improve his original argument by adding refinements. 
In this paper it is shown how schemes and critical questions are used together to analyze 
and evaluate examples of arguments in a way that depend on the notion of an initiative 
shift. As a critical question is asked, the initiative shifts onto the arguer who originally 
put forward his argument so that he must either respond appropriately to the critical ques-
tion or his argument is defeated. However, if he is able to answer the critical question 
successfully, the initiative shifts back to the questioner to ask another question, or other-
wise the argument is judged to be tentatively acceptable.  
 We regard the concept of burden of proof as complex (Gordon and Walton 
2009), and so we replace it here with the simpler concept of an initiative, taken from 
(Hamblin 1970: 274). As explained by Hamblin, a shift of initiative takes the requirement 
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to support some proposition with evidence from one party in a dialogue and puts it on the 
other party. The general principle is that he who asserts must prove. Shifts of initiative 
take place as the argumentation proceeds in a case where the parties take turns making 
moves. They do not represent what is called burden of persuasion in law, but are more 
like tactical burden of proof (Prakken and Sartor 2009). 
 Precisely how this back-and-forth process works, and how it provides some kind 
of useful mechanism for helping us to evaluate an argument that fits the scheme, are mat-
ters that some still seem to be unclear and hesitant about. After all, using a question to 
shift an initiative does not seem like a method of argument evaluation that is exact and 
subject to calculation by precise methods of the kind we are familiar with using formal 
deductive logic or Bayesian methods of calculation. Although there are now computa-
tional argumentation systems using argumentation schemes (Verheij 2003; Bex et al. 
2003; Reed and Walton 2005; Walton and Gordon 2005), there remain some fundamental 
questions about how these formal models of defeasible argumentation can be applied to 
real examples of arguments in a way that would make them helpful for those of us in the 
field of argumentation study. The purpose of this paper is to offer some clear and helpful 
answers to these questions. 
 The central arguments of the paper are that (a) by clarifying these critical ques-
tions and reformulating them, to some extent, so that they fit into a standardized format, 
we can bring out the deeper structure of each argumentation scheme, and (b) once this 
process of restructuring has been carried out, the schemes along with their matching criti-
cal questions so reformulated can be used in the Carneades argumentation model (Gor-
don, Prakken and Walton 2007; Gordon and Walton 2009) as tools for argument analysis, 
evaluation and construction. 
 The example of a scheme chosen for illustration to show how the method of re-
formulation works is the one for argument from expert opinion. This scheme is intro-
duced, along with its matching set of critical questions, in section 1. The two theories 
about how the initiative shifts when a critical question is asked are presented in section 2. 
The problem of judging what should happen when apportioning initiative in real cases is 
discussed in section 3. In section 4 it is shown how managing the shifting of initiative in 
some of the critical questions better fits the one theory, while managing others better fits 
the other theory. The Carneades model of argumentation is introduced in section 5, and 
applied to the problem of reformulating the critical questions in section 6. The conclu-
sions are in section 7. 
2. ARGUMENTATION SCHEMES AND CRITICAL QUESTIONS  
Argumentation schemes represent stereotypical patterns of reasoning used in everyday 
conversational argumentation, and in other contexts as well, like forensic debating and 
legal argumentation. They are patterns of defeasible reasoning that have long been stud-
ied in argumentation theory. Indeed, they could be described as recent descendants of the 
long tradition of study of the so-called topics of Aristotle. Hastings (1963), Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), Kienpointner (1986), Walton (1996), Grennan (1997) and Wal-
ton, Reed and Macagno (2008) have identified and studied many schemes of kinds found 
in examples of everyday conversational arguments and legal arguments. Recently there 
has also been considerable interest in argumentation schemes in computer science, espe-
MODELING CRITICAL QUESTIONS AS ADDITIONAL PREMISES 
3 
cially in the field of artificial intelligence, where they are increasingly being recognized 
in computational domains like multi-agent systems as holding potential for making sig-
nificant improvements in the communication capabilities of artificial intelligent agents in 
the semantic web (McBurney and Parsons 2009; Prakken 2010). 
 The scheme representing argument from expert opinion was formulated in (Wal-
ton 1997: 210), with some minor notational changes, as shown below, with two premises 
and a conclusion. E is an autonomous agent of a kind that can possess knowledge in some 
subject domain. The domain of knowledge, or subject domain, is represented by the vari-
able F for field of knowledge. It is assumed that the domain of knowledge contains a set 
of propositions. 
(1) Major Premise: Source E is an expert in field F containing proposition A. 
(2) Minor Premise: E asserts that proposition A (in field F) is true (false). 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(3) Conclusion: A may plausibly be taken to be true (false).  
As shown in Walton (1997) any given instance of an argument from expert opinion needs 
to be evaluated in a dialogue where an opponent (respondent) can ask critical questions. 
The six basic critical questions matching the appeal to expert opinion (ibid.: 223), with 
some minor modifications, are the following.  
 CQ1: Expertise Question: How knowledgeable is E as an expert source? 
 CQ2: Field Question: Is E an expert in the field F that A is in? 
 CQ3: Opinion Question: What did E assert that implies A? 
 CQ4: Trustworthiness Question: Is E personally reliable as a source? 
 CQ5: Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert? 
 CQ6: Evidence Question: Is E’s assertion based on evidence? 
CQ1 refers to the expert’s level of mastery of the field F. CQ4 refers to the expert’s trust-
worthiness. For example, if the expert has a history of lying, or is known to have some-
thing to lose or gain by saying A is true or false, these factors would suggest that the ex-
pert may not be personally reliable. The assumption made in (Walton, 1997) was that if 
the respondent asks one of the six critical questions the initiative shifts back to the propo-
nent’s side to respond to the question appropriately. The asking of the critical question 
defeats the argument temporarily until the critical question has been answered successful-
ly. This approach was a first pass to solving the problem of how to evaluate an argument 
from expert opinion. More specifically, it was designed to offer students in courses on 
critical argumentation some direction on how to react when confronted with an argument 
from expert opinion. Although the critical questions stated in (Walton, 1997) were meant 
to be useful for this purpose, they were also meant to be open to formulation in a more 
precise manner that might make formalizations of argumentation schemes possible.  
 Argumentation schemes representing the structure of defeasible types of argu-
ments, like argument from expert opinion, are proving to be very useful in artificial intel-
ligence. However, an initial problem with applying such schemes is that the arguments 
they represent are evaluated using a set of critical questions matching each scheme. Part 
of the problem is that it is not easy to represent questions in a tree structure of the sort 
standardly used for argument evaluation. However, if questions could be treated as addi-
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tional premises that are implicit in the argument, this problem could be easily solved. But 
an additional problem is that the critical questions do not behave in a uniform way in this 
regard. If the mere asking of a critical question was enough to defeat the argument put 
forward, in every instance of a question matching a scheme, the procedure of treating 
critical questions as additional premises would work. However, some of the critical ques-
tions cannot be fitted into this format. The method of evaluating an argument like one 
from expert opinion is by a shifting of initiative in a dialogue (Walton 1997). When the 
respondent asks one of the six critical questions an initiative shifts back to the propo-
nent’s side, defeating or undercutting the argument temporarily until the critical question 
has been answered successfully. But things do not always work this way. In some in-
stances, the asking of an appropriate critical question is not sufficient by itself to defeat 
the original argument, unless the critical question is backed up by evidence that increases 
its force.  
3. TWO THEORIES ABOUT INITIATIVE SHIFTING 
As will be shown in this section, there are differences between the critical questions on 
how strongly or weakly asking the question produces such a shift of initiative. Such ob-
servations have led to two theories about requirements for initiative shifting when critical 
questions matching the argument from expert opinion are asked (Walton and Godden 
2005). According to one theory, in a case where the respondent asks any one of these 
critical questions, the initiative automatically shifts back to the proponent’s side to pro-
vide an answer, and if she fails to do so, the argument defaults (is defeated). In other 
words, merely asking the question is enough to defeat the argument, at least temporarily. 
Of course, if the proponent provides some appropriate answer to the question, the argu-
ment retains its status. 
 On this theory, only if the proponent does provide an appropriate answer is the 
plausibility of the original argument from expert opinion restored. This could be called 
the shifting initiative theory, or SI theory. How it works in determining whether the re-
spondent has to accept the argument as plausible is shown in table 1. 
Proponent Respondent Effect on Initiative 
Puts forward argument 
fitting scheme 
Asks appropriate  
critical question 
Initiative shifted to 
proponent to reply 
Fails to answer  
question 
Does not have to  
accept argument 
Initiative not shifted,  
so argument defaults 
Answers critical  
question 




Table 1. The Shifting Initiative Theory 
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According to the other theory, asking a critical question should not be enough to make 
the original argument default. The question, if questioned, needs to be backed up with 
some evidence before it can shift any burden that would defeat the argument. This could 
be called the backup evidence theory, or BE theory. How it works is shown in table 2.  
Proponent Respondent Effect on Initiative 
Puts forward argument 
fitting scheme 
Asks appropriate critical 
question 
No initiative shifted onto 
proponent to reply 
Replies to question 
without giving backup 
evidence 
Must accept argument 
anyhow 
No initiative shifted, so 
argument stays in place 
Asks for backup 
evidence to support 
question 
Fails to present appropriate 
backup evidence 
Initiative shifts to 
respondent 
Asks for backup 
evidence to support 
question (again) 
Provides evidence to 
support question 
Initiative shifts to 
proponent 
Fails to question 
evidence 
Does not have to accept 
argument 
Proponent’s initiative not 
met, so argument defaults 
 
Table 2: The Backup Evidence Theory 
In Table 2, it is shown how the original argument stands even if the proponent replies to 
the critical question by simply saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ without providing any evidence to 
back up her reply. Only if the respondent specifically cites evidence of the sort that would 
back up the question does the proponent’s argument default. These theories can be tested 
by examining the precise formulations each of the critical questions. It may be that some 
of the questions fit one theory or the other better. 
4. RECONSIDERING THE CRITICAL QUESTIONS  
Look back to the six critical questions matching argument from expert opinion and ask 
yourself what would happen in a dialogue as each question might be put to the proponent 
of the argument by the respondent. Look at the field question first. It already states in the 
major premise that E is an expert in the field that A is in. Thus asking the field question is 
merely asking whether the premise in the original argument is true. The respondent mere-
ly questions the premise. When critically questioning any argument, like one from expert 
opinion, one avenue of attack that is always available is to question any one of the premises. 
 Now look at the expertise question. It asks how credible E is as an expert source. 
In other words, it asks about E’s level of expertise, or mastery of the field that the propo-
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sition at issue is in. Is E merely a beginner, a rookie, or has she been a working expert in 
this field for a lifetime, winning advanced degrees and awards, perhaps even a Nobel 
Prize? Such differences will affect how strong the argument from expert opinion is taken 
to be. The expertise question seems to ask for a comparative rating, a matter of degree. 
The higher the rating of credibility of the expert source, the stronger the argument from 
expert opinion will be. What if the proponent can’t give an appropriate answer to this 
question? It seems hard to judge what should happen on initiative, as it is not made clear 
precisely what sort of answer is required. Maybe the proponent could say, “E is fairly 
credible”. Would that be enough to answer the question, or should the proponent have to 
give some reason to back up the claim that E has enough credibility to satisfy the ques-
tion, by offering some evidence, like “E has been practicing in the field for twenty 
years”? It seems difficult to decide. 
 Let’s next look at the opinion question. It asks what E asserted that implies A. 
This could be A itself (since A implies A), or it could be some other proposition that E 
asserted that implies A. If the former is the case, the question is redundant, because the 
minor premise already tells us that E asserted A. If the former is the case, the original argu-
ment from expert opinion fails, because E failed to meet the requirement stated in the premise.  
 This dichotomy leaves us without a decision, however, when it comes to dealing 
with real arguments from expert opinion, of the kind most commonly encountered. In 
such cases, the critic is trying to judge the worth of the argument based on what the ex-
pert said. In such a case the expert made some pronouncement, and the claim attributed to 
her needs to be extracted from that text by directly quoting the text or reporting it. There 
are two types of cases. First, the claim, the proposition at issue, can be found in the text 
by quoting it. Second, an inference can be drawn from what was quoted to the proposition 
claimed as attributable to the expert. In reality, there can be all kinds of problems in such 
cases, because the expert could be misquoted, or correctly quoted, but the claimed propo-
sition may only be implicitly contained in what she said, rather than being explicitly con-
tained in the text. Still, despite all these complications, maybe it is sufficient to rule that if 
the proponent supplies some specific proposition allegedly implied by what the expert 
said, that this should be enough to satisfy the questioner. On this view, the initiative shifts 
back to the respondent once the proponent supplies such a proposition. What should hap-
pen, however, if the proponent fails to supply such a proposition? Should her argument 
default or not? It seems like she should have to supply a proposition meeting the request, 
or the argument should default, but the issue remains open of how to judge whether the 
proposition needs to match exactly what the expert said.  
 Now let’s look back at the trustworthiness question. It refers to the reliability of 
the source as one that can be trusted. It would be a powerful attack on an argument from 
expert opinion if the expert was shown to be biased or a liar. But unless there is some 
evidence of this, the proponent could simply answer ‘yes’, and that would seem to be 
enough to answer the question appropriately. To plausibly question whether an expert 
might be biased or dishonest, and to make the charge stick, the questioner needs to pro-
duce at least some putative evidence of bias or dishonesty. On the other hand, there do 
seem to be two theories about the force of this question. Some might say that if the re-
spondent asks this question, it does seem to reasonably shift the initiative back to the pro-
ponent to offer some assurance that the expert is trustworthy. If the proponent were to 
merely reply, ‘You prove that she isn’t personally reliable as a source!’, that would seem 
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to be evasive. On this view then, if the trustworthiness is asked, it should shift the initia-
tive back the proponent to offer some evidence of trustworthiness, or else the argument 
form expert opinion should default. But if the respondent fails to give any evidence that 
the expert is untrustworthy, the proponent could reply, “There is no evidence of that at 
all”, shifting the initiative to the respondent’s side to back up his question with evidence. 
Thus two approaches seem open. 
 Now let’s turn to the last two questions, the consistency question and the backup 
evidence question. In both these instances, the question needs some evidence to back it 
up before it makes the argument default. Any claim that what the expert said might not be 
consistent with what other experts in the same field say needs to be shown by telling us 
what the other experts said, and how these statements conflict with what our expert said. 
Otherwise, the proponent can simply answer ‘yes’ to the question, and that should be 
enough to preserve the argument from expert opinion. Similarly, if the backup evidence 
question is asked, the answer ‘yes’ seems sufficient. If the question were expressed dif-
ferently, the response required might also be different. For example, if the question were, 
‘What evidence was E’s assertion based on?’, then the proponent would have to supply 
some such evidence in order to answer the question successfully.  
5. SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION  
The results of this discussion of how each of the six critical questions fits the SI theory or 
the BE theory can be summarized as follows.  
 
1. The Expertise Question. It expresses a quantitative question asking how strong the ex-
pert’s mastery of the field is. The expert presumably needs to have some mastery of the 
field for the argument from expert opinion to have any worth. Can it be assumed that if 
someone is an expert they have at least some mastery of the field? If so, failure to give a 
specific answer should not be enough to make the argument default. But if the argument 
can be very weak, depending on the context, it could default. Thus it does not seem to be easy 
to arrive at a general rule on whether the expertise question fits the SI theory or the BE theory. 
 
2. The Field Question. It is part of the minor premise, even though it is not a full premise. 
On the assumption that it is a required part of a premise, failure to back it up adequately 
means that the argument should default. This analysis supports classifying the field ques-
tion under the SI theory.  
 
3. The Opinion Question. Here the discussion was not conclusive. If the proponent fails to 
supply a proposition supposedly representing what the expert claimed, her argument 
should default. But the discussion remained open on the issue of how to judge whether 
the proposition needs to match exactly what the expert said, or whether it could be im-
plied by logical inference from what the expert said. It seemed like there is more room for 
specific criteria to apply to these kinds of cases. Still, if the proponent gives no answer at 
all to the question, it would be a bad failure, suggesting that the argument should default. 
This analysis would suggest that the SI theory applies. 
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4. The Trustworthiness Question. As shown in the discussion above, there are two ap-
proaches to deciding whether this question better fits the SI theory or the BE theory. Un-
less the respondent gives some evidence indicating that the expert is untrustworthy, the 
proponent could simply reply, “There is no evidence of that at all”, shifting the initiative 
to the respondent’s side to back up his question with evidence. This interpretation sup-
ports the BE theory. But if the proponent offers no evidence to back up the expert’s 
trustworthiness, his argument seems weak. This interpretation supports the SI theory. 
 
5. The Consistency Question. To make this question have any force, presumably some 
evidence to support it is required. Thus it fits the BE theory better. 
 
6. The Evidence Question. Generally it is assumed that what a genuine expert claims is 
backed up by some evidence in the field or domain of knowledge of the expert. This would 
seem to be a generally reasonable assumption in the case of a scientific expert. If so, to 
make the evidence question shift the burden of proof against the proponent, some evidence 
backing up the question is required. Thus this question fits the SI theory better as well. 
 
The above discussion of these critical questions suggests that it can be argued that some 
of them fit the SI theory better while others fit the BE theory better. But much depends on 
the standards of argument acceptance that are appropriate in a given case, and on factors 
of the context of the dispute, including the general standard of burden of proof in the dia-
logue. While the same argumentation schemes are used in different contexts of dialogue, 
how the critical questions should be managed with respect to burden of proof is a factor 
that can be stabilized in a systematic way, depending on the standard and burden of proof 
for argumentation in a type of dialogue. 
6. THE CARNEADES SYSTEM  
As we all know, sophisticated automated techniques of searching for a designated conclu-
sion from a given set of premises in a knowledge base are now widely employed in compu-
ting. We can use this technology along with argumentation schemes to chain forward from 
a given argument to see if it can be extended by other arguments connected to it that enable 
the chain to reach a designated conclusion. Once the premises and the conclusion of the 
given argument have been identified, we can apply the search engine, and it will recursive-
ly apply all the rules of inference to the premises, chain toward the conclusion, and either 
reach the designated conclusion or not. This feature is typical of rule-based systems. To be 
of practical use, however, the rules of inference used in the system need to be comprehen-
sive enough to include widely used forms of argument, like argument from expert opinion, 
argument from analogy, argument from appearance, and argument from witness testimony.  
 Carneades uses argumentation schemes, and applies them to argument construc-
tion (invention) as well as to argument analysis and evaluation. Carneades is a mathemat-
ical model consisting of definitions of mathematical structures and functions on these 
structures (Gordon, Prakken and Walton 2007). It is also a computational model, meaning 
that all the functions of the model are computable. Carneades defines mathematical prop-
erties of arguments that are used to identify, analyze and visualize real arguments. Car-
neades models the structure and applicability of arguments, the acceptability of state-
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ments, burdens of proof, and proof standards, for example preponderance of the evidence. 
Carneades has been implemented using a functional programming language, and has a 
graphical user interface (http://carneades.github.com).  
 The screen shot shown in Figure 1 gives the reader an idea of how argument 
from expert opinion can be represented in the graphical user interface. In figure 1, the text 
boxes contain statements that are premises or conclusions in the argument. Each state-
ment has a status, and a symbol appears in the box for each statement indicating its status 
as follows. If a statement is accepted, a check mark appears in front of it and the text box 
has a green fill. If a statement is rejected, an X mark appears in front of it, and the text 
box has a red fill. If a statement has merely been stated, but not accepted or rejected, 
there is no symbol in front of it, and the text box has no fill. The question mark indicates 
that the statement has been called into question but has not been accepted or rejected. 
Each circle that appears on the line represents an argument. The ultimate conclusion of 
the argument appears on the left. In this case, that is the statement that A may be taken to 
be true. A pro argument is indicated by a plus sign in its node. A con argument is indicat-
ed by a minus sign in its node. The example shown in figure 1 is merely meant to give the 
reader some idea of how arguments are represented graphically in the system. 
 
 
Figure 1: An Example Argument in the Carneades Graphical User Interface 
In the example shown in figure 1, additional evidence supporting three of the premises is 
shown in the column of three boxes on the right. The middle column of boxes represents 
premises, assumptions and exceptions. 
 The original motivation of the Carneades system was to accommodate two dif-
ferent variations on what happens when a respondent asks a critical question (Walton and 
Gordon 2005). On the one theory, as indicated above, when a critical question is asked, 
the burden of proof shifts to the proponent’s side to answer it. On the other theory, mere-
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ly asking the question does not defeat the proponent’s argument until the respondent of-
fers some evidence to back it up. Carneades approaches this distinction by distinguishing 
three types of premises in an argumentation scheme, called ordinary premises, assump-
tions and exceptions. The ordinary premises are represented as lines from a text box to a 
node (circle) in figure 1. They appear as solid green lines on the screen. The exceptions 
are represented as dashed lines. They appear as dashed red lines on the screen. The as-
sumptions are represented as more finely dashed (dotted) lines. They appear as dotted 
green lines on the screen. Assumptions are assumed to be acceptable unless called into 
question. Exceptions are modeled as premises that are not assumed to be acceptable and 
which can block or undercut an argument as it proceeds. Ordinary premises of an argu-
ment, like assumptions, are assumed to be acceptable, but they must be supported by fur-
ther arguments in order to be judged acceptable. 
 The Carneades method of determining the acceptability of an argument can be 
summarized as follows (Gordon and Walton 2009). At each stage of the argumentation 
process, an effective method (decision procedure) is used for testing whether some prop-
osition at issue is acceptable, based on the arguments of the stage and a set of assump-
tions. The assumptions represent undisputed facts, the current consensus of the partici-
pants, or the commitments or beliefs of some agent, depending on the task. This determi-
nation may depend on the proof standard applicable to the proposition at issue, given the 
dialogue type and its protocol. What is used is a decidable acceptability function provided 
by the Carneades model of argument. This method of modeling argumentation can be 
applied to argument reconstruction and argument invention.  
 The Carneades system for reasoning with argumentation schemes is a computation-
al model that builds on ontologies from the semantic web. It defines structures for represent-
ing various elements of argumentation, and shows how they function together in arguments. 
These elements include propositions, arguments, cases, issues, argumentation schemes and 
proof standards. Arguments in the Carneades system are visualized as a directed graph, as 
shown in Fig. 1, in which the nodes (circles) in the middle represents the argument and the 
leaves in the tree (text boxes) represents the premises and conclusions in the argument.  
7. HOW CARNEADES HANDLES CRITICAL QUESTIONS  
In the Carneades system, critical questions matching an argument can be classified into 
three categories, depending on whether they are treated as ordinary premises, assumptions 
or exceptions. Defeaters (rebuttals) are modeled as arguments in the opposite direction for 
the same conclusion. For example if one argument is pro the conclusion, its rebuttal would 
be another argument con the same conclusion. Premise defeat is modeled by an argument 
con an ordinary premise or an assumption, or pro an exception (Gordon 2005: 56).  
 This system enables a distinction to be drawn between two ways an argument 
from expert opinion should be critically questioned, and thus enables the critical questions 
to be represented as implicit premises of an argumentation scheme represented on an argu-
ment diagram. The two assumptions that (1) the expert is trustworthy and (2) that what she 
says is consistent with what other experts say, are assumed to be false. It is assumed, in 
other words, that (1) and (2) are false until new evidence comes in to show that they are 
true. The two assumptions that (1) the expert is credible as an expert and that (2) what she 
says is based on evidence, are assumed to be true, until such time as new evidence comes in 
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showing they are false. Also assumed as true are the assumptions that (1) the expert really 
is an expert, (2) she is an expert in the subject domain of the claim, (3) she asserts the claim 
in question, and (4) the claim is in the subject domain in which she is an expert.  
 Now let’s look once again at the expertise question, to see how it could be clas-
sified. It is about E’s depth of knowledge in the field F that the proposition at issue lies 
in. As noted above, the expertise question seems to ask for a comparative rating. What if 
the proponent fails to answer by specifying some degree of expertise, like “very credible” 
or “only slightly credible”? As noted above it seems hard to decide what the effect on the 
original argument should be. Should it be defeated or merely undercut? It seems like it 
should only be undercut, because even if we don’t know how strong the argument from expert 
opinion is, it might still have some strength. It might even be very strong, for all we know.  
 The field and opinion questions can be modeled as ordinary premises of the ar-
guments from expert opinion scheme in Carneades. Now let’s look back at the trustwor-
thiness question, which refers to the reliability of the expert as a source who can be trust-
ed. If the expert was shown to be biased or a liar, that would presumably be a defeater. It 
would be an ad hominem argument used to attack the original argument, and if strong, 
would defeat it. But unless there is some evidence of ethical misconduct, as noted above, 
the proponent could simply answer ‘yes’, and that would seem to be enough to answer 
the question appropriately. As noted above, to make such a charge stick, the questioner 
should be held to supporting the allegation by producing evidence of bias or dishonesty.  
 According to the discussion above, only the consistency and backup evidence 
questions need some evidence to back them up before the mere asking of the question 
defeats the original argument. Hence only these two of the critical questions are treated as 
exceptions. The results of how the critical questions should be classified as premise on 
the Carneades model can be summed up as follows.  
 Premise: E is an expert. 
 Premise: E asserts that A. 
 Premise: A is within F. 
 Assumption: It is assumed to be true that E is a knowledgeable expert. 
 Assumption: It is assumed to be true that what E says is based on evidence in field F. 
 Exception: E is not trustworthy.  
 Exception: What E asserts is not consistent with what other experts in field F say.  
 Conclusion: A is true. 
The distinction between assumptions and exceptions, on the Carneades model, tells us 
which answer to a critical question can be assumed, if the critical question has not been 
asked yet. The expertise question and the backup evidence question can be modeled as 
assumptions in Carneades. This tells us that it can be assumed that it is true that the ex-
pert is a credible source who has knowledge in some field, and that the expert’s evidence 
was based on some evidence in the field. The way these questions are modeled fits the 
dialogues displayed in table 1 above. Carneades models the trustworthiness question and 
the consistency question as exceptions, telling us that the initiative does not shift until the 
criticisms that the expert is biased or dishonest, or otherwise is not personally reliable as 
a source are backed up by further evidence. It also tells us that the criticism that what the 
expert said is inconsistent with what other experts said must be backed up by further evi-
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dence. The way these questions are modeled fit the shifting initiative dialogues displayed 
in table 2 above.  
7. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we chose the argumentation scheme for argument from expert opinion to 
illustrate a particular way of managing any argumentation scheme in relation to its set of 
appropriate critical questions. However, we could have chosen any of the set of 65 or so 
schemes presented in the compendium of schemes in (Walton Reed and Macagno, 2008). 
The method of handling the critical questions works the same way with each of these 
schemes. The special feature of the Carneades system in this regard is that it solves the 
problem of burden of proof posed by the dichotomy between the SI theory and the BE 
theory by reconfiguring the notion of an argument through its use of the three-way dis-
tinction: ordinary premises, assumptions and exceptions. Ordinary premises have to be 
supported by further arguments even if they have not been questioned. In the case of ex-
ceptions, however, the opponent who would attack the argument is the one who has to 
offer evidential support to make his criticism defeat the argument. 
 Through the illustration of the argumentation scheme for argument from expert 
opinion, it was shown why it did not seem to be initially possible to solve the shifting of 
initiative problem by dealing with the critical questions in a uniform way. But then it was 
shown how using the Carneades system makes it possible to manage critical questions 
matching the schemes by using resources already available in logic and computational 
modeling of arguments. In the usual way of representing arguments that has now become 
standard, the propositions that play the roles of premises and conclusions in the argument 
are displayed as text boxes that form the leaves of a tree. It is not easy to see how critical 
questions matching scheme could be represented in this format, because questions are 
different from propositions. Carneades solves both these problems at one stroke by repre-
senting the critical questions as different kinds of premises. The assumptions and the ex-
ceptions are treated as implicit premises that, once made explicit, fill out the structure of 
an argumentation scheme. This process of reconfiguring each of the argumentation 
schemes and its matching set of critical questions provides us with a new way of evaluat-
ing defeasible arguments of the kinds that fit the schemes. 
 The implications of the findings of this paper are highly significant for further 
research on argumentation, because what has been proposed is a new way of restructuring 
the logic of argumentation schemes and their matching critical questions. The old way of 
formulating the structure of a scheme represented the logic of the argument as fitting the 
scheme in a simple way that included only the ordinary premises. The new model of the 
structure of the scheme adds implicit premises that are divided into two categories. The 
shift from the old to the new model has many implications for the study of fallacies and 
for the study of proleptic arguments that reply to an objection (or the posing of a critical 
question) by anticipating it. But more work needs to be done. Only one scheme, the ar-
gument from expert opinion, was used to illustrate how the process of reformulation 
should work in general. The program of research laid out for the future is the project of re-
examining the remaining schemes to see how the SI theory and the BE theory apply to them. 
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Commentary on “MODELING CRITICAL QUESTIONS  
AS ADDITIONAL PREMISES”  
by Douglas Walton and Thomas Gordon 
SCOTT F. AIKIN 
Philosophy Department 
Vanderbilt University 




In this comment, I will briefly press three lines of questioning regarding Professors Gor-
don and Walton’s “Modeling Critical Questions as Additional Premises.” First, I have 
questions about how to square the claim that clarifying critical questions “brings out the 
deeper structure of each argument scheme” and the thesis that the analysis of these ques-
tions comes to matters of determining initiative. Second, I have broader concerns about 
the dialogical model for argument this account depends on, especially for ad verecundiam 
arguments. Third, and finally, I am unsure that the initiative shifting and backup evidence 
models track the various questions the way Gordon and Walton portray them to. I will 
pose a brief counter-example. 
2. CRITICAL QUESTIONS AS PREMISES 
First is the question whether it is accurate to say that critical questions add or function as 
premises in arguments. Gordon and Walton’s initial statement, namely that the questions 
bring out the deeper structure of the argument schemes, seems more plausible. So, with 
ad verecundiam arguments, surely we may say that the introduction of expert E’s opinion 
that p in field F pragmatically implicates that E and E’s statements satisfy the conditions 
that the critical questions pursue. I will concede that the answers to the questions function 
as clarifying premises, particularly suppressed ones, but the questions are requests for 
them to be made explicit.  
3. ESSENTIALLY DIALOGICAL 
Second is the commitment that ad verecundiam (and presumably by extension all the 
basic argument schemes) are essentially dialogical: “[A]ny given instance of an argument 
from expert opinion needs to be evaluated in a dialogue where an opponent (respondent) 
can ask critical questions” (Walton and Gordon). 




(1) Toothpaste commercials with the claim “9 out of 10 dentists agree…” There’s 
nobody there to answer our critical questions about whether that was out of 10 
dentists on the ad company’s pay wagon (or any other question: do they have li-
censes, are they not dentists in the 17
th
 Century).  
(2) All those scholastics who use “The philosopher says…” as a means of premise-
introduction. They are dead—they can’t answer our critical questions.  
(3) An advertisement with a famous basketball player selling jeans (in Walton 1997). 
Surely these argumentative failures are not based on the fact that we can’t ask questions 
to the person giving the arguments.  
 Now, it can be conceded that the felicity conditions for arguments from authority are 
that the speaker and audience are not themselves experts, but this dialectical constraint on 
when it is appropriate to use the form does not itself make the form of argument fundamen-
tally dialectical. And note, further, that if the answer to this challenge is that one must pro-
ceed with critical questions as if there were a dialogue (or that the model for representing 
argument evaluation is dialogue), then we have changed what the model is about, as the point 
is no longer about standards for an argument, but critical practice for listeners. 
4. VARIABLE STANDARDS 
Third, given variability of critical standards and starting points for arguments, there are 
variations in the default-status for critical questions. One case can be exemplary. Sally 
gets her information about international affairs from the New York Times. In conversation 
with her neighbors about, say, how Israel stands on the new Hamas-Fatah coalition, that 
her facts come from the Times is sufficient. Saying, “NYT is fairly credible,” is enough. 
But now imagine her worried about a niece travelling in Palestine. “NYT is fairly credi-
ble,” sounds far too weak. The point is that as stakes change, standards for evaluation 
change, and so default status for one response to a critical question varies not only with 
issue, but with issue urgency. The point is that there are other pragmatic, but not dialogi-
cal, constraints on argument quality. 
 My critical comments here belie my broader agreement with Gordon and Wal-
ton. I’ve been convinced that the scheme-model is appropriate and that success of sche-
matic arguments in meeting the demands of proper support requires their satisfying a 
number of desiderata. These desiderata are correlated with critical questions. This is a 
perspicuous way of presenting defeasible reasoning. My concerns are primarily with the 
details of how this model is manifested in dialogue form 
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